Economic predictions often hinge on two intuitive premises: agents rule out the possibility of others choosing unreasonable strategies ('strategic reasoning'), and prefer strategies that hedge against unexpected behavior ('cautiousness'). These two premises conflict and this undermines the compatibility of usual economic predictions with reasoning-based foundations.
Introduction
Economists commonly use iterated strategy elimination procedures as solution concepts in games. Such procedures thus constitute one of the cornerstones for modeling agents' behavior in economic theory. The predictive power of iterated elimination procedures is in general lower than that of equilibrium-related notions; however, since the latter requires players to correctly forecast their opponents' behavior (see Aumann and Brandenburger, 1995) , the former seems more appropriate in situations of multiple equilibria wherein either the players or the economic analyst lack accurate data about past play or such data appears uninformative about future behavior. 1 For instance, this is the case in many application of auction theory, e.g., wireless spectrum, carbon emission rights and online advertising. 2 Consequently, thorough understanding of the forces behind iterated elimination is relevant from both a purely theoretical perspective and a more applied point of view, and is key to effective mechanism design and correct identification in empirical analyses. 3
The conceptual appeal of iterated elimination procedures is that they carry the intuitive game-theoretic appeal of strategic reasoning: if a player is certain that some of her opponent's strategies are not going to be played, then she might deem some of her own strategies to be unreasonable. 4 However, as discussed in Samuelson's (1992) classic analysis, strategic reasoning is in conflict with the criterion of cautiousness, which dictates that players favor strategies that, ceteris paribus, hedge against unexpected behavior. If players are modeled as expected utility maximizers, the clash seems inescapable: Strategic reasoning requires each player i's beliefs to assign zero probability to some of the strategies of i's, while cautiousness requires player i's decision to be sensitive to those strategies that receive zero probability (and are therefore of negligible importance for the maximization problem). Given that economic modeling often invokes the avoidance of weakly dominated strategies-a specific kind of cautiousness-as a criterion for equilibrium selection, 5 the seemingly mutually exclusive nature of strategic reasoning and cautiousness requires clarification. Such an understanding is desirable in particular in scenarios where behavior is likely to be reasoning-based and cautiousness plays a role. This paper proposes a new take on this longstanding problem by suggesting a novel theoretical foundation for the interplay between strategic reasoning and cautiousness. The 1. Introduction analysis by Samuelson (1992) clearly shows that two ingredients are necessary to overcome this tension: First, multiple beliefs are needed to account for epistemic conditions that would be mutually excluding if required to be satisfied by a single belief. Second, the best-reply needs to be sensitive to all these beliefs. We achieve this within our framework by augmenting the underlying standard decision-theoretic foundation for each player by allowing for incomplete preferencesà la Bewley (2002) where: (i) Each player's strategic uncertainty is represented by a possibly non-singleton set of beliefs thus allowing for ambiguity, and (ii) a rational player chooses a strategy that is a best-reply to every belief in her set, so that the resulting choice is robust to the possible ambiguity faced by the player. 6
Under this set-up, and inspired by Brandenburger, Friedenberg and Keisler (2008) , we say that a player assumes certain behavior by her opponents if at least one of the beliefs in her set has full-support on the collection of states representing such behavior. Consequently, the introduction of ambiguity and the requirement of robustness give great flexibility: It is possible for a player to assume certain behavior and, simultaneously, assume certain more restrictive behavior. If the player is also rational, her choice needs to be a best-reply to both of these beliefs. Hence, in particular, the tension between strategic reasoning and cautiousness is solved: A player can be strategically sophisticated by having one belief that assigns zero probability to her opponents playing dominated strategies, and at the same time cautious by having another belief that assigns positive probability to every strategy of her opponenents. Thus, our model overcomes the problem as identified by Samuelson (1992) since it allows precisely for the two necessary ingredients.
Based on the above, we build a framework that provides reasoning-based foundations for iterated admissibility-the iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies. In Theorem 1 we show that, when type spaces are belief-complete (roughly speaking, rich enough to capture any possible belief hierarchy), iterated admissibility characterizes the behavioral implications of rationality, cautiousness, and common assumption thereof. From our characterization, it is easy to see that the foundations of iterated admissibility necessarily require the presence of ambiguity whenever strategic reasoning has any bite. If the elimination procedure consists of multiple rounds, the set of ambiguous beliefs needs to contain a specific belief with full-support on the set of opponents' strategies that survive each round.
Theorem 2 provides the analysis for the relaxation of belief-completeness and shows that, in this case, it is self-admissible setsà la Brandenburger, Friedenberg and Keisler (2008) which characterize the behavioral implications of rationality, cautiousness and common assumption thereof. Although the main approach in the paper is conceptual and focused on the link between cautiousness in reasoning-based processes and robustness to ambiguity, the results provide a methodological contribution for the use of incomplete preferences in game theory, which is a subject of interest in itself aside from its interpretation as a reflection of ambiguity. 7
The literature studying the conflict between strategic reasoning and cautiousness is epitomized by the seminal paper by Brandenburger, Friedenberg and Keisler (2008) , who shed light on the question by building upon the lexicographic probability system approach by Blume, Brandenburger and Dekel (1991a,b) . 8 Lexicographic probability systems represent the uncertainty faced by a decision maker whose preferences depart from standard Bayesian preferences by allowing violations of the continuity axiom. In this setting, Brandenburger, Friedenberg and Keisler (2008) provide reasoning-based foundations for finitely many iterations of weakly dominated strategy elimination based on rationality and finite-order assumption of rationality, but also present a celebrated impossibility result: under some standard technical conditions and generically in all games, common assumption of rationality cannot be satisfied. This negative result has spurred a line of research concerned with obtaining sound epistemic foundations for iterated admissibility. Lee (2015) and Yang (2015) propose answers by tweaking topological properties of the modeling of higher-order beliefs and the notion of assumption, respectively, while Lee (2016) obtains foundations by proposing a modification in the definition of coherence. 9 Catonini and De Vito (2018a) also provide foundations by introducing a weaker notion of the likeliness-ordering of events that characterizes the lexicographic probability system, and via an alternative definition of cautiousness that restricts attention to the payoff-relevant component of the states. In a slightly different direction, Heifetz, Meier and Schipper (2019) propose a new solution concept, comprehensive rationalizability, that coincides with iterated admissibility in many settings and admits epistemic foundations. Within a standard Bayesian decision-theoretic model, Barelli and Galanis (2013) provide a characterization for iterated admissibility by introducing an exogenous 'tie breaking' criterion. Robustness to ambiguity is studied by Stauber (2011 Stauber ( , 2014 with a different interpretation from ours.
Our paper can be regarded as complementary to the lexicographic probability system approach as standard Bayesian preferences are also abandoned by dropping completeness instead of continuity. Both these relaxations allow for multiple beliefs, but while the former requires a specific order, our model drops the order altogether and allows for multiplicity 7 As argued by Aumann (1962) : "Of all the axioms of utility theory, the completeness axiom is perhaps the most questionable. [. . . ] [W]e find it hard to accept even from the normative viewpoint. Does 'rationality' demand that an individual make definite preference comparisons [. . . ]" Previous applications of Bewley's (2002) model to game theory include, among others, Shannon (2011, 2014) , who study mechanism design and optimal contracting, respectively.
8 Early contributions along the same lines include, for example, Brandenburger (1992) and Stahl (1995) . 9 Similar to Epstein and Wang (1996) , coherency is imposed on the preferences directly, not only on the beliefs that represent the preferences.
directly. However, apart from the transparent link between cautiousness and robustness to ambiguity that our framework allows for, the nice structure of the sets of ambiguous beliefs representing incomplete preferences has some additional advantages. First, it is easy to show that rationality and common assumption of rationality is a non-empty event and thus, that iterated admissibility is properly founded for all games. Second, the definitions and formalism involved do not require departures from the canonical definition of the objects involved: (i) The modeling of higher-order beliefs (i.e., the type structures employed), including the definition of coherence, and the version of assumption that we rely on are natural extensions of their counterparts in the realm of standard Bayesian preferences;
and (ii) the notion of cautiousness invoked in our theorems is not necessarily restricted to environments where the sets of states have a specific structure (e.g. games). 10 Finally, the presence of ambiguity via incomplete preferences has been shown to be empirically testable by recent work by Cettolin and Riedl (2019) .
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. First, Section 2 provides an informal, non-technical overview of the effect of robustness to ambiguity on predictions in games, and specifically, on iterated admissibility as a solution concept. Section 3 reviews both the game-theoretic and the decision-theoretic preliminaries and Section 4 introduces the epistemic framework and the interpretation of strategic cautiousness as a manifestation of robustness of ambiguity. Section 5 the presents the epistemic characterization results. Section 6 concludes. All proofs and purely technical digressions are relegated to the appendices. This is the 'inclusion-exclusion' problem as identified by Samuelson (1992) . On the one hand, Ann should include R in her belief because she is cautious. On the other hand, she should exclude R because she believes that Bob is rational and cautious.
In our framework, we have more flexibility because players are not Bayesian, but are allowed to have a (potentially non-singleton) set of beliefs. To see how this relaxation avoids the tension just described, we provide a slightly more elaborate example, which also explores the reasoning of the players more explicitly.
Example 2. Again, there are two players, Ann and Bob, who play the following game:
Now suppose that each player faces ambiguity (as described by Bewley, 2002) about the strategy choice of their opponent. That is, neither player has a unique belief about the opponent's strategy choice, but rather each has a set of beliefs. In particular, suppose that Ann has a convex closed set of beliefs described by two extreme points. Her first belief is uniform across all of Bob's strategies, µ 1 A (s B ) = 1/4 for s B = A, B, C, D, and her second (extreme) belief is uniform across A, B, and C only, µ 2 A (s B ) = 1/3 for s B = A, B, C. Similarly, Bob faces uncertainty about Ann's choice. Consider the following set of beliefs for Bob, which also has two extreme beliefs. The first is uniform across all of Ann's strategies, Bewley (2002) are incomplete, and for incomplete preferences there is no obvious definition of rationality: Optimality is a stronger requirement than maximality for incomplete orders. As stated in the introduction, the solution to the inclusion-exclusion problem requires that a best-reply to be sensitive to all beliefs. Thus, we identify rationality with optimality so that a rational strategy is a best-reply to all beliefs, i.e. the choice needs to be robust to the ambiguity faced by the player. In this example this implies that Ann will not rationally choose L since it is not a best-reply that is robust to the ambiguity that she faces. H and M , on the other hand, are best-replies to all beliefs and are therefore rational choices for Ann. For Bob, only D is not rational because it is not a best-reply to any of his beliefs. The three other strategies A, B, and C are rational as they are best-replies to all of his beliefs. Thus, with these sets of beliefs the prediction of the model would correspond to iterated admissibility. This is not a coincidence and foreshadows our results on the characterization iterated admissibility, explained in more detail below, wher the strategic reasoning is also made explicit.
Heuristic treatment of strategic reasoning
In the previous examplesit can be seen that a set of beliefs enables strategic reasoning and cautiousness to be incorporated. To study games in general, players need to be allowed to reason about the reasoning process of other players too. This necessitates the formalizing of infinite sequences of the following form:
a 1 : Ann is rational and cautions b 1 : Bob is rational and cautions a 2 : a 1 holds and Ann assumes b 1 b 2 : b 1 holds and Bob assumes a 1 a 3 : a 1 holds and Ann assumes b
If this infinite sequence holds, we say that there is rationality, cautiousness, and common assumption thereof (RCCARC).
To study these infinite sequences and to see which strategies are played if they hold, Figure 1 : Cautiousness be a best-reply to this marginal. It then follows from Pearce (1984) that she must choose a strategy which is not weakly dominated. Now, it is possible to study the infinite sequences described above. In this case the picture that emerges looks like Figure 2 . Here the small area with solid boundary corresponds to all strategy-type combinations of Bob satisfying RCCARC. Now, set a strategy-type combination (s A , t A ) for Ann. Does this type correspond to RCCARC for Ann? i.e. does the type satisfy the sequence a 1 , a 2 , . . .? It is already known that if a 1 holds there needs to be a belief in the associated set of beliefs which has support as µ 1 A . Next, it is considered that Ann assumes b 1 . This rules out some of Bob's strategy-type pairs, but also requires t A to have a belief which has full support on the remaining pairs. Thus, in the associated set of beliefs there needs to a belief µ 2 A . In the next step, Ann is considered to assume b 1 and b 2 . Similar reasoning applies and there needs to be a belief like µ 3 A in the set of beliefs corresponding to t A . This procedure can now be iterated (as indicated in the picture) to verify whether the type t A corresponds to RCCARC for Ann. Only finite games are considered here so at some stage n this iteration no longer rules out any strategies for Bob. However, it might be the case that at every step there are still some types of Bob's that need to be ruled out. In the worst case there needs to be a different belief for each iteration as the support of each belief is changing over the course of the sequence. However, this does not cause a problem. For each type the set of beliefs could be potentially very large. 12 Since such large sets of beliefs are within the framework under consideration, the event RCCARC is not empty. Thus we do not get a negative result, as Brandenburger, Friedenberg and Keisler (2008) find in a different framework. To illustrate more specifically how this analysis works, types are added explicitly for the example considered above.
Example 2 (continuing from p. 6). Consider the following type space
and define (with some abuse of notation) the following beliefs on S B × T B :
Similarly, define the following beliefs on S A × T A :
Given these beliefs, define the set of beliefs M i (t i ) for each type as follows:
Now, it is possible to analyze the infinite sequences a 1 , a 2 , . . . and b 1 , b 2 , . . . introduced above. a 1 is the event that Ann is rational and cautious, so we must collect all strategy-type pairs which satisfy the full-support requirement (cautiousness) and the requirement that the strategy is a best-reply to all beliefs of the given type (rationality). Here, all types but t 0 i have at least one belief with full support on S −i × T −i . Together with rationality this gives that the following strategy-type pairs correspond to a 1 :
So both a 1 and b 1 rule out some strategy-type pairs and in particular the weakly dominated strategy D is ruled out. Next, to get to a 2 , we want to find all types of Ann that assume b 1 . That is, all types of Ann that have at least one belief with full-support on {A,
Again, note that in this step the interactive reasoning leads to the ruling out of L, which is weakly dominated after elimination of D. In the next step (i.e. a 3 and b 3 ), types t 2 i are ruled out, but no more strategies. This construction, however, would lead to the conclusion that a 4 and b 4 do not correspond to any strategy-type pairs. The solution, and this is the main idea of how to prove one direction of Theorem 1, is to add more types. For each iteration add another type with full support on the previous rounds (similar to types t 3 i ). This gives an infinite (but countable) number of types and only the "limiting" type corresponds to RCCARC. This argument shows that the illustration in Figure 2 is accurate in the sense that for higher order iterations the supported strategies are constant, but only types are removed in each round.
Theorem 2 provides a direct (and hence different) way to construct finite type spaces so that for strategy-type pairs satisfying RCCARC the strategies of iterated admissibility (or those of any other self-admissible set) are obtained.
Preliminaries
This section presents the main standard concepts and formalism related to game and decision theory. The object of study is the inclusion-exclusion problem inherent in the iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies raised by Samuelson (1992) . Thus, Section 3.1 recalls the formalization of strategic-form games, iterated admissibility (Luce and Raiffa, 1957; Moulin, 1979) and self-admissible sets (Brandenburger, Friedenberg and Keisler, 2008) . However, our analysis models players as individual decision makers whose beliefs may display ambiguity via incomplete preferences. Section 3.2 recalls the necessary decision-theoretical toolbox and Bewley's (2002) model of incomplete preferences as formalized by Gilboa, Maccheroni, Marinacci and Schmeidler (2010) , and highlights its key features. 13
Games and iterated strategy elimination
A game consists of a tuple G := I, (S i , u i ) i∈I where I is a finite set of players, and for each player i there is a finite set of (pure) strategies S i and a utility function u i : S → R, where S := i∈I S i denotes the set of strategy profiles. For each player i a randomization of own strategies σ i ∈ ∆(S i ) is referred to as a mixed strategy, 14 and a probability measure
When necessary, with some abuse of notation, we use s i to refer to the degenerate mixed strategy that assigns probability one 13 Section A in the appendix provides futher details on the decision theoretic foundations and on how to envision games as decision problems, as is standard in the literature since Tan and da Costa Werlang (1988) (see Di Tillio (2008) for a more detailed formulation).
14 Throughout the paper, for any topological space X, as usual, ∆ (X) denotes the set of probability measures on the Borel σ-algebra of X. to s i . Each conjecture µ i and possibly mixed strategy σ i naturally induce expected utility U i (µ i ; σ i ) and based on this, each player i's best-reply correspondence is defined by assigning to each conjecture µ i the subset of pure strategies BR i (µ i ) that maximize its corresponding expected utility. 15
Following the duality results of Pearce (1984) , we use the best-reply correspondence directly to define iterated admissibility whose foundations are then studied in Section 5.
Strategy s i is iteratively admissible if it survives the iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies; i.e., if it is not weakly dominated given strategy profiles S −i × S i , it is not weakly dominated given strategy profiles W 1 −i × W 1 i consisting only of strategies surviving the first elimination round, etc. Thus, formally, strategy s i is iteratively admissible
where W 0 i := S i and for any n ∈ N,
Finally, that set of strategy profiles Q = i∈I Q i is said to be a self-admissible set (SAS)
if for every player i the following three conditions are satisfied:
(iii) For every s i ∈ Q i and every mixed strategy
The connection between the notions of self-admissibility and iterated admissibility is immediately apparent: the set of iteratively admissible strategy profiles is a self-admissible set of game G, but in general there are other self-admissible sets. For details see Brandenburger and Friedenberg (2010) , who also study properties of self-admissible sets for specific (classes of) games.
Decision problems and incomplete preferences
We follow the reformulation of Anscombe and Aumann's (1963) framework by Fishburn (1970) . The decision maker faces decision environment (Z, Θ) where: (i) Z is a set of outcomes, which can be informally understood as the elements that will ultimately yield direct utility to the decision maker; and (ii) Θ is a set of states (of the world) about which the decision maker might face uncertainty, and which may affect how her choices relate to outcomes. We refer to randomizations of outcomes, ∈ ∆(Z), as lotteries. A preference is a binary relation over the set of acts, F, which is the collection of all maps f : Θ → ∆(Z) that assign a lottery to each state. M (Θ) denotes the set of closed and convex nonempty subsets of Θ. 16 Throughout the paper we focus on preferences which we call Bewley preferences, since they were introduced by Bewley (2002) . 17 The main point of departure from the preferences of a standard Bayesian decision maker (i.e., one whose preferences satisfy the axioms by Anscombe and Aumann, 1963) is that completeness of the preferences is dropped. Theorem 1 by Gilboa, Maccheroni, Marinacci and Schmeidler (2010) provides the following convenient representation for these preferences: 
A decision maker's epistemic attitude with respect to the source of uncertainty may not be represented by a single belief, as in the standard case, but rather by a possibly non-singleton set of beliefs that reflects the decision maker's possible ambiguity towards that source of uncertainty. As argued extensively in Section 5, this is key to resolving the inclusionexclusion problem. With such preferences the decison maker is allowed to have beliefs with different supports, but also needs to respond robustly to her ambiguity by best-replying to all of her beliefs: for act f to be regarded as at least as good as another act g, the expected utility for f must be at least as high as the expected utility for g for every belief in the set of ambiguous beliefs. Notably, recent work by Cettolin and Riedl (2019) presents experimental tools that enable it it be tested whether the preferences display this form of ambiguity via incompleteness. 16 To be more mathematically precise, Z is assumed to be finite, Θ is compact and metrizable and the elements of F, simple and measurable in the Borel σ-algebra of Θ. Space Mi(S−i × T−i) is endowed with the topology induced by the Hausdorff metric and is therefore compact and metrizable.
17 Actually we rely on a more modern version by Gilboa, Maccheroni, Marinacci and Schmeidler (2010) of Bewley's (2002) original preferences. Bewley's (2002) version requires the decision-maker to have a designated default act always chosen unless ranked strictly lower than some alternative. This is commonly known in the literature as inertia (see, Bewley, 2002, or Lopomo, Rigotti and Shannon, 2011) . Furthermore, the version of Gilboa, Maccheroni, Marinacci and Schmeidler (2010) allows for infininte state spaces which are necessary in our framework.
18 Details about the axioms on preferences and how to map the game theoretic setup to a decision environment can be found in Appendix A.
19 More precisely, M is non-empty closed and convex. Moreover, M is unique and u is unique up to positive affine transformations.
Reasoning in games
For the rest of the paper we consider game G to be fixed and therefore drop most explicit mentions to it. In this section we present the epistemic framework that we employ below to establish foundations for iterated admissibility in Section 5. Formally, for each player we specify a choice and a representation of her beliefs on her opponents' strategies, her beliefs on her opponents' beliefs over their opponents' strategies, etc. These elements suffice to assess whether under such specifications, the player is being rational, has preferences that exhibit ambiguity (i.e. multiple beliefs) or has certain higher-order beliefs on her opponents' rationality and the presence of ambiguity in their preferences. The question then is which precise constraints on rationality and higher-order beliefs on opponents' rationality induce the behavior captured by iterated admissibility. Section 5 provides an answer based on the formalism developed in this section.
However, some previous methodological work is required. As seen above, when ambiguity via incomplete preferences is allowed for, the representation of uncertainty may require non-singleton sets of beliefs. It follows that standard type structures as introduced by Harsanyi (1967 Harsanyi ( -1968 and standard belief-hierarchiesà la Mertens and Zamir (1985) are not suitable for analyzing strategic reasoning: They fail to capture the possibility of ambiguity. Instead, we rely on a modified version of type structure that accounts for ambiguous beliefs. 20 Thus, in Section 4.1 we first introduce these ambiguous type structures. We build on them and then, in Section 4.2, define the restrictions on behavior and beliefs required for the results in Section 5.
Ambiguous type structures
The study of strategic reasoning requires an instrument that formalizes players' beliefs about their opponents' choices, players' beliefs about their opponents' beliefs about their opponents' choices and so on. When players have complete preferences this hierarchical uncertainty can easily be represented through type structures. Thus, it is convenient to extend the definition of the latter so that can deal with the possibility of ambiguity. Formally, an ambiguous type structure consists of a list T := T i , M i i∈I where for each player i there is: 21
associates each type with ambiguous beliefs on opponents' strategy-type pairs.
It is easy to see why ambiguous type structures capture the idea of hierarchical reasoning mentioned at the beginning of the paragraph. For any player i's type t i it is possible to compute the following by recursive marginalization: 22
(1) First-order ambiguous beliefs that represent type t i 's uncertainty about her oppo-
, which is easily obtained by taking the marginals on S −i of the beliefs in M i (t i ).
(2) Second-order ambiguous beliefs that represent type t i 's uncertainty about her opponents' strategy-first-order ambiguous beliefs pairs,
· · ·
(n) n th -order ambiguous beliefs that represent type t i 's uncertainty about her opponents' strategy-(n − 1) th -order ambiguous beliefs pairs, M i,n (t i ) ∈ M i,n := M i ( j =i (S j × M j,n−1 )).
Ambiguous type structure T is said to be complete if every map M i is surjective, that is, if for every possible ambiguous beliefs the ambiguous type structure may admit, there exists some type that is mapped to such ambiguous beliefs. 23
Behavioral and epistemic conditions
The analysis of each player i's reasoning is focused on strategy-type pairs (s i , t i ), which specify both player i's choice, and as described above, her ambiguous beliefs on her opponents' choices, her ambiguous beliefs on her opponents' first-order ambiguous beliefs, etc.
Thus, each strategy-type pair (s i , t i ) enables questions such as the following to be addressed:
Is player i rational given her beliefs? Do her preferences embody some kind of ambiguity?
What are her higher-order beliefs about her opponents' rationality and ambiguity? Next, 22 The conceptual simplicity that follows contrasts the notational complexity that it requires; technically, for each n ∈ N we have:
There exists some µ i ∈ Mi(ti) such that:
As shown by Ahn (2007) , the answers to the following modified questions in (Dekel and Siniscalchi, 2015, p. 629 we first formalize the notion of rationality that we employ (Section 4.2.1). Second, we introduce our formalization of cautiousness as a manifestation of ambiguity (Section 4.2.2).
Finally, we define the appropriate tool to impose restrictions on higher-order beliefs (Section 4.2.3), which is a generalization to Bewley preferences of the usual notion of full-support belief for standard Bayesian preferences.
Rationality
We say that strategy s i is rational for type t i if s i is a best-reply to every first-order ambiguous belief induced by t i ; thus, the set of strategy-type pairs in which player i is rational is formalized as follows:
Note that the definition implicitly requires each type t i , in order to be eligible for rational behavior, to satisfy that the intersection of the best-replies to the ambiguous first-order beliefs induced by it is non empty. 24 This is a consistency requirement in the vein of Bayesian updating for conditional probability systems in the literature of dynamic games:
When a conditional probability system fails to satisfy Bayesian updating it may not admit sequential best-replies. 25
Cautiousness and ambiguity
We next argue that cautiousness, intuitively thought of as the decision maker considering every state of the world when deciding which choice is best, can be interpreted as a product of ambiguity in the sense that types that exhibit cautiousness tend to represent preferences that also display ambiguity. We first formalize the notion of cautiousness that takes part in the characterizations result in Section 5 and then discuss its linkt to ambiguity. 26 24 We discuss this requirement in detail in Appendix A, where we first separate the condition that ensures non-emptiness of the intersection of best replies (decisiveness) from rationality per se, and provide a behavioral characterization for it. 25 We thank Pierpaolo Battigalli for this observation. This issue, which refers to the distinction between a choice being optimal or undominated, is discussed in further detail in Section A in the appendix, which also provides a behavioral foundation for a non-empty intersection. 26 We note that all of the following analyses could have been carried out employing a slightly weaker notion of cautiousness than the one introduced in Definition 1. In principle it would suffice to require full support on S−i rather than S−i × T−i. Our reason for opting for the stronger notion is twofold: (i) It does not prevent our characterization from dispensing with impossibility issuesà la Brandenburger, Friedenberg and Keisler (2008) (see Section 5.3), so it is clear that it is not modifications in the notion of cautiousness that enable for this to be achieved; and (ii) since it does not apply only to state spaces with product structure, it has a more general decision-theoretic foundation.
Definition 1 (Cautiousness). Let G be a game and T , an ambiguous type structure. Then, for any player i and any type t i we say that type t i is cautious if at least one belief in M i (t i ) has full-support on S −i × T −i . We denote the set of player i's strategy-type pairs in which the type is cautious by C i .
If at an intuitive level cautiousness is seen as the idea that a decision maker takes every possible contingency into account, then that is present in this definition. Cautiousness requires, loosely speaking, that every state is taken into account by the decision maker. 27
The link with ambiguity is easy to see. In principle, it is possible for a type to display cautiousness but not ambiguity. This is the case of every type whose set of ambiguous beliefs consists of a single belief with full-support on S −i × T −i as in Figure 1 . However, if in addition to cautiousness the type also exhibits some form of strategic sophistication in the sense of having a (different) belief that rules out some proper subset of S −i × T −i , then, necessarily, the type displays ambiguity: The corresponding ambiguous beliefs a fortiori contain at least two different beliefs. Hence, the introduction of ambiguity not only enables strategic reasoning and cautiousness to be made compatible, but is indeed, necessary when strategic reasoning has any bite.
Assumption
Hereafter we refer to measurable subsets E ⊆ S ×T as events. A standard Bayesian decision maker is said to assume event E when the unique subjective belief induced by her preference has full-support on E. 28 Some changes are in order if this idea is to be extended to Bewley preferences: The set of ambiguous beliefs may contain beliefs that have different supports.
We say that a Bewleyian decision maker assumes event E when at least one belief in her set of ambiguous beliefs has full-support on E. Given the inclusion-exclusion problem, it is natural to consider such a weak version of assumption. As discussed in Section 1, it is necessary to have multiple beliefs which have potentially different supports to resolve the tension between strategic reasoning and cautiousness.
Definition 2 (Assumption). Let G be a game and T , an ambiguous type structure. For any player i, any type t i and any event E −i ⊆ S −i × T −i we say that type t i assumes E −i if at least one belief in M i (t i ) has full-support on the topological closure of E −i . We denote the set of player i's strategy-type pairs in which the type assumes E −i by A i (E −i ). 27 Cautiousness is also present in the analysis by Brandenburger, Friedenberg and Keisler (2008) . However, there it is incorporated into the definition of rationality. We find it more transparent to explicitly define the event when a player is cautious.
28 Technically, we are considering the collapse of the notion of assumption (see Keisler, 2008 and Dekel, Friedenberg and Siniscalchi, 2016) under the lexicographic probability system when the preferences satisfy continuity and the corresponding lexicographic probability system thus collapses to a single belief.
Remark 1. Cautiousness as defined in Definition 1 can be restated in terms of assumption: A type t i is cautious if it assumes S −i × T −i .
Iterated admissibility and ambiguous types
This section presents the main results of the paper. Based on the observation made in the previous section that the presence of ambiguity can reconcile strategic reasoning with cautiousness, we provide foundations for iterated admissibility and self-admissibility in terms of rationality, cautiousness, and certain higher-order assumption constraints. We provide those foundations in Section 5.1. Then, in Section 5.2, we discuss the link between iterated assumption and ambiguity to resolve the inclusion-exclusion problem. Finally, in Section 5.3 we review the seminal impossibility result due to Brandenburger, Friedenberg and Keisler (2008) within the approach in terms of lexicographic probability systems, recall some of the responses in the related literature, and explore the connection with our result.
Epistemic foundation
As mentioned above, the epistemic foundation of iterated admissibility is to be formulated in terms of rationality, cautiousness, and higher-order assumption restrictions. The set of strategy-type pairs in which player i exhibits common assumption in rationality and cautiousness is given by CARC i := n≥0 CARC i,n , where each CARC i,n is defined recursively by setting:
for every n ∈ N. That is, CARC i brings toghether all the strategy-type pairs (s i , t i ) where player i's type t i assumes that every player j = i is rational, cautious, and assumes that every player j = i assumes that every player k = j is rational, cautious, and so on. Based on the above: 29
Theorem 1 (Foundation of iterated admissibility). Let G be a game. For any player i the following holds:
(i) For any complete ambiguous type structure, any player i and any strategy-type pair (s i , t i ), if type t i is consistent with cautiousness and assumption of rationality and 29 The theorem is stated and holds only for a complete type structure because the assumption operator is not monotone. This is similar to, for example, assumption in Brandenburger, Friedenberg and Keisler (2008) or strong belief of Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) . An example showing why completeness is needed is available upon request. cautiousness and s i is rational for t i , then s i is iteratively admissible; i.e.,
(ii) For any player i and any strategy s i , if s i is iteratively admissible then there exist a complete ambiguous type structure T and a type t i consistent with cautiousness and assumption of rationality and cautiousness for which s i is rational; i.e.,
Thus, Theorem 1 provides a complete characterization of iterated admissibility. Part (i) is a sufficiency result. It shows that whenever a player chooses in a robust way that maximizes with respect to higher-order assumptions that represent common assumption in rationality and cautiousness, then the resulting strategy is necessarily iteratively admissible. Part (ii) is, partially, the necessity counterpart: while it is not true that every time an iteratively admissible strategy is chosen this is due to the player being rational, cautious, and best-replying to the higher-order assumption restrictions that represent common assumption in rationality and cautiousness, it is true that every iteratively admissible strategy is a rational choice for a type that is consistent with common assumption in rationality and cautiousness. The proof of the theorem is provided by iteration and relies on the slightly stronger result according to which, n rounds of elimination of weakly dominated strategies characterize the behavioral implications of rationality, cautiousness and n − 1 rounds of assumption in rationality and cautiousness. 30 Notably, from a conceptual perspective, the theorem reveals that whenever the elimination procedure involves more than one round, satisfying the epistemic conditions above requires players' preferences to display ambiguity. As the next theorem shows, if the requirement of completeness of the type structure is dropped then the behavioral consequences of rationality, cautiousness and common assumption thereof are captured by self-admissibility:
Theorem 2 (Foundation of self-admissibility). Let G be a game. Then:
(i) For any ambiguous type structure T the set of strategies consistent with rationality, cautiousness and common assumption of rationality and cautiousness is a selfadmissible set; i.e., the following set is self-admissible:
(ii) For any self-admissible set Q there exists a finite ambiguous type structure T for which Q characterizes the behavioral implications of rationality, cautiousness and common assumption of rationality and cautiousness; i.e., such that:
The interpretation is analogous to that of Theorem 1. Part (i) states that given an arbitrary ambiguous type structure, not necessarily complete, the set of strategy profiles that are consistent with rationality, cautiousness and common assumption of rationality and cautiousness is a self-admissible set. Part (ii) offers the partial converse: For any given self-admissible set Q there exists an ambiguous type structure T , notably, finite, such that Q is exactly the set of strategy profiles that are consistent with rationality, cautiousness and common assumption of rationality and cautiousness within T . Theorems 1 and 2 are clearly connected because the set of iteratively admissible strategy profiles is itself self-admissible.
In particular, for a fixed game this reveals that the set of iteratively admissible strategies can be understood as strategies obtained not only in a very large complete type structure, but also under a smaller finite one in which, as shown in the proof of Theorem 2, each player i only has as many types as there are iteratively admissible strategies plus one additional dummy type. 31
Iterated assumption and ambiguity
The main distinctive feature of assumption with respect to the usual belief for Bayesian agents, and as in the assumption operator of Brandenburger, Friedenberg and Keisler (2008) , is the failure of monotonicity. 32 Whenever a Bayesian agent believes in event E, she also believes in every event F such that E ⊆ F : The (Bayesian) belief µ i that assigns probability one to E assigns probability one to F . This is not the case with our notion of assumption.
Type t i might assume event E via some belief µ i ∈ M i (t i ) that has full-support on E, but she may fail to assume an event F such that E ⊆ F ; 33 even if t i assumed such F , it certainly, could not be via µ i . Thus, when considering a sequence of nested events such as the finite iterations in the common assumption events defined above, a single belief can assign probability one to all the events in the sequence simultaneously, but different beliefs are required in order to assume each of them at the same time. This is exactly why the inclusion-exclusion problem arises within a standard Bayesian framework, but it can be resolved within our framework.
In principle there is no reason to consider that the assumption of an event is an expression of cautiousness; for every type there exists always an event that is assumed and this simply relates to which specific states play some role in how preference ranks acts. However, the assumption of different nested events is a non-trivial feature that reveals a cautious attitude: Whenever a type assumes two nested events E and F , the preference represented is crucially sensitive to comparisons at every state in E but also to comparisons at every state in the larger event F , in particular to those outside E. Of course, as mentioned above, the simultaneous assumption of different events necessarily requires belief multiplicity.
(Non-)Emptiness of common assumption of rationality and cautiousness
The canonical epistemic foundation of iterated admissibility in the literature is due to Brandenburger, Friedenberg and Keisler (2008) . Their seminal result shows that m rounds of elimination of non-admissible strategies characterize the behavioral implications of rationality and m th -order mutual assumption of rationality for finite m in a model where players' uncertainty is formalized by type structures where types are mapped to lexicographic probability systems. As shown by Blume, Brandenburger and Dekel (1991a) , lexicographic probability systems arise under a variation of Anscombe and Aumann's (1963) preferences in which the axiom of continuity is relaxed (rather than that of completeness, as in Bewley's (2002) variant). However, Brandenburger, Friedenberg and Keisler (2008) also reveal a vexatious feature of the common assumption case: Their celebrated impossibility result shows that for every generic game, if the type structure is complete and maps types continuously, then common assumption in rationality is empty. Below we also discuss the work by Keisler and Lee (2015), Yang (2015) , Lee (2016) and Catonini and De Vito (2018a) , who propose changes in the formalism that allow for sound epistemic foundations, and compare their results to ours.
Notice first that within our set-up, and for every game G, common assumption in rationality and cautiousness is never empty in complete ambiguous type structures. The intuition behind the claim is easy to see: For each iteration in player i's reasoning process set a belief µ n i ∈ ∆(S −i × T −i ) that has full-support on the topological closure of j =i R j ∩ CARC j,n (these collections of strategy-type pairs are clearly never empty; thus, the belief µ n i always exists). Then, define M i as the topological closure of the convex hull of {µ n i } n∈N , and by virtue of the ambiguous type structure being complete, pick type t i with ambiguous beliefs M i . 34 By construction, t i is a type representing common assumption of rationality and cautiousness and hence, CARC i is non-empty.
Furthermore, as briefly mentioned in Section 1, the non-emptiness of rationality and common assumption thereof does not follow from specific alterations in the formalism (beyond the different decision-theoretic model underlying the approach). This is easier to visualize by direct comparison with other studies that also provide sound foundations for iterated admissibility. Keisler and Lee (2015) obtain their result by dropping the requirement that types are mapped continuously, Yang (2015) considers a weaker version of assumption than that in Brandenburger, Friedenberg and Keisler (2008) and Lee (2016) explictly imposes coherence on the preferences, which is usually only checked for the beliefs that represent the preferences. For lexicographic probability systems, which he builds on, this makes a difference. As said, we do not require any of these modifications: Our type structures map types continuously, our notion of assumption is a direct adaption of that in Brandenburger, Friedenberg and Keisler (2008) and Dekel, Friedenberg and Siniscalchi (2016) , 35 and the coherence requirement implicit in our type strucutres resembles the standard one in literature due to Brandenburger and Dekel (1993) . 36 Finally, Catonini and De Vito (2018a) consider a weaker version of the likeliness-ordering of events that characterizes the lexicographic probability system and an alternative version of cautiousness where only the payoff-relevant aspect of the states of the world play any role. Again (and despite Theorems 1 and 2 would remain unchanged under this alternative notion of cautiousness), we obtain our non-emptiness result with a standard, purely decision-theoretic notion of cautiousness that does not require any specific structure of the set of states.
To end this section, we present a comparison between lexicographic probability systems and ambiguous beliefs that provides some understanding of the differences between the two approaches with respect to the presence of ambiguity. Remember that a lexicographic probability system consists of a finite sequence beliefs {µ k } n k=1 ⊆ ∆(Θ), 37 where the order of the sequence represents the epistemic priority attached to each element: µ 1 is the decision maker's 'primary' hypothesis, µ 2 is the 'secondary' hypothesis, and so on. This is reflected by the lexicographic consideration, i.e. if act f is better than g for belief µ 1 , then the comparison between the two acts for the rest of the beliefs in the sequence is immaterial and the decision maker prefers f to g. The main distinction between lexicographic probability systems and ambiguous beliefs is then clear: Both are composed of multiple beliefs, but the former incorporates a hierarchy in terms of epistemic priority and hence removes any trace of ambiguity. However, as we show above, this hierarchy is not important to overcome the inclusion-exclusion problem; what is important is the multiplicity of beliefs.
35 See also Footnote 28. 36 The requirement is explicit in the construction by Ahn (2007) . 37 Brandenburger, Friedenberg and Keisler (2008) use lexicographic conditional probability systems, but their result extends to more general lexicographic probability systems as shown by Dekel, Friedenberg and Siniscalchi (2016) .
Conclusions
Cautiousness in games is intuitively understood as the idea that even when a player deems some of her opponents' strategies to be completely unlikely (typically on the basis of strategic reasoning), she still prefers to choose strategies that are immune to deviations towards such unexpected strategies. This is at odds with the strategically sophisticated expected utility maximization process representing a standard Bayesian rational decision maker who believes her opponent to be rational too: Every suboptimal strategy of the latter is assigned zero probability by the subjective belief of the former, and cannot therefore affect the decision process. This paper proposes a new theoretic understanding of cautiousness in interactive settings that reconciles it with strategic sophistication. We interpret cautiousness under strategic sophistication as a manifestation of robustness to ambiguity, which renders more choices as non-optimal. Then we show that the resulting behavioral implications can be obtained as a consequence of rationality and related higher-order assumption constraints. Specifically:
(i) We introduce the possibility of ambiguity in beliefs by allowing players' preferences to be incomplete. This is done by replacing the standard Anscombe and Aumann (1963) decision-theoretic framework behind each player with a model of (possibly) incomplete preferencesà la Bewley (2002) so that each player's uncertainty about her opponents' behavior is represented by a possibly non-singleton set of beliefs that reflects the decision maker's possibly ambiguous uncertainty. Our main result implies that for choices that are iteratively admissible the justifying set of beliefs has to be non-singleton for non-trivial games.
(ii) We apply the framework described above to study the epistemic (i.e. reasoning-based) foundations of iterated admissibility in belief-complete type structures and find that it characterizes the behavioral implications of rationality, cautiousness, and common assumption thereof (Theorem 1). For non-complete type structures we find that it is self-admissible sets that characterize the behavioral implications of such an event (Theorem 2).
Thus, the main insight is immediately apparent: The inclusion-exclusion problem of Samuelson (1992) can be resolved not only by relaxing continuity of preferences (i.e. through lexicographic probability systems), but also by relaxing completeness (while maintaining continuity). Notably, this enables us to provide a sound epistemic foundation of iterated admissibility-a challenging task within the framework of lexicographic probability systems.
Using our approach, it is easy to see that the event of rationality, cautiousness, and common assumption thereof is non-empty across all games-unlike, for instance, the foundations for iterated admissibility under lexicographic probability systems, as found by Brandenburger, Friedenberg and Keisler (2008) , and the instruments involved in our characterization (type structures and assumption operators) are straightforward generalizations of those in the realm of standard Bayesian preferences. In addition, the suggested link between ambiguity via incomplete preferences and the presence of cautiousness is potentially testable by applying techniques for the identification of incompleteness of preferences recently developed in the literature on experimental economics (see Cettolin and Riedl, 2019) .
Finally, the formalism shows that even with incomplete preferences, an iterative solution concept is valid and well-founded. To elaborate, note that the inclusion-extension problem extends, well-beyond iterated admissibility, to every (non trivial) iterated deletion procedure that incorporates cautiousness. This is apparent in Dekel and Fudenberg's (1990) procedure (the DF-procedure; persistency in Brandenburger, 2003, and De Vito, 2018b) , which consists of one round of elimination of weakly dominated strategies followed by the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Here, the notion of cautiousness behind the first elimination round requires player i's beliefs to assign positive probability to every strategy by her opponents (i.e. to include all strategies of the opponents) whereas the iterated elimination that follows requires player i's beliefs to assign zero probability to opponents' strategies that did not survive the first round (i.e. to exclude some strategies).
Hence, the presence of inclusion-exclusion issues makes understanding the DF-procedure problematic from the standard Bayesian perspective. Unsurprisingly, the tension can again be solved via multiplicity of beliefs resulting from ambiguity. Say that player i believes event E if at least one belief in her set of ambiguous beliefs assigns probability one to E.
It is easy to show then that the DF-procedure characterizes the behavioral implications of rationality, cautiousness (as defined in Section 4.2.2) and common belief thereof. 38 In addition, it is immediately possible to replicate, within this framework, the well-known result that rationalizability (the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies) characterizes rationality and common belief thereof. A comparison between these two observations and Theorem 1 illustrates the theoretical connection between cautiousness and strategic reasoning on the one hand, and ambiguity on the other: In the absence of cautiousness (i.e. rationalizability) behavior can be explained without appealing to ambiguous beliefs, but the latter becomes a sine qua non condition as soon as the solution concept relies on any notion of cautiousness (i.e iterated admissibility and the DF-procedure).
A Decision Theory

A.1 Decision problems and Bewley preferences
Given a decision environment (Z, Θ), a decision problem consists of a triplet (Z, Θ, F ) where F is a subset of acts that we call feasible and represents the acts that are materially available to the decision maker. 39 Bewley preferences satisfy the following axioms: A1. Preorder.
is reflexive and transitive.
A2. Monotonicity. For any pair of acts f, g, f (θ) g(θ) for any θ ∈ Θ =⇒ f g.
A3.
Continuity. For any three acts f, g, h the following two are closed in [0, 1]:
A4. Nontriviality. There exist two acts f, g such that f g and not g f .
A5
. Certainty-Completeness. For any two constant acts f, g either f g or g f .
A6
. Independence. For any acts f, g, h and any α ∈ (0, 1),
Theorem 1 in Gilboa, Maccheroni, Marinacci and Schmeidler (2010) shows that these axioms characterize the preferences to get the representation stated in the main text.
A.2 Games as decision problems
Players are envisioned as individual decision makers facing a decision problem where their opponents' strategies are part of the description of the states of the world and strategies are the feasible acts. For obvious reasons, for each player i, game G is a very specific decision problem (Z i , Θ i , F i ) consisting of:
• Outcomes. In contexts of complete (payoff-relevant) information, player i's utility depends only on the strategy profiles chosen in the game; hence, we identify outcomes with the latter: Z i := S.
• States. Player i's primary source of uncertainty (and the only payoff-relevant one)
is strategic: it refers to her opponents' behavior (S −i ). However, player i's beliefs about her opponents' strategies could be affected by an additional non payoff-relevant unobserved parameters about which she might face uncertainty, say T −i . 40 We identify the set of states of the world with these joint sources of uncertainty: Θ i := S −i × T −i .
• Acts and feasible acts. Player i's set of acts is F i := ∆(S) S −i ×T −i . Notice that within the context of a game this set of acts is not feasible. First, player i cannot make her choice contingent on a parameter t −i that she does not observe. Second, in situations of simultaneous choice, player i cannot make her choice contingent on her opponents' choices. Still, player i might (and typically will) have preferences on modeled but unavailable options. The set of player i's feasible acts is then identified with her mixed strategies:
In addition, remember that game G already incorporates utility functions; thus, each player i's set of Bewley preferences under consideration needs to be restricted to those preferences whose risk attitude is represented by utility function u i . Now, Theorem 1 by Gilboa, Maccheroni, Marinacci and Schmeidler (2010) implies that for any set of parameters T −i , each Bewley preference for decision environment (S, S −i × T −i ) whose risk attitude is represented by u i is biunivocally associated with ambiguous beliefs M i ⊆ ∆(S −i × T −i ). 41 Thus, there is no loss of generality in switching the focus from Bewley preferences to ambiguous beliefs, the collection of which we denote by M i (S −i × T −i ).
A.3 Decisiveness
We refer to the types that admit rational choices as decisive. The foundation of decisiveness in terms of preferences is provided by Proposition 1 below. Decisive types are those induced by preferences that are possibly incomplete but display completeness at the top: the decision maker is indifferent between two acts that are not less preferred than another act. 42
Proposition 1 (Behavioral foundation of decisiveness). Let G be a game and T , an ambiguous type structure. Then, any player i's type t i is decisive if and only if there exists a subset of feasible acts F * i ⊆ F i , such that i , the Bewley preference represented by
for every f, g ∈ F * i and every h ∈ F i \ F * i .
Proof. Fix player i, type t i and event E −i ⊆ S −i × T −i and let i denote the Bewley preference represented by (u i , M i (t i )). The 'if' part is immediate, so we focus on the 'only if' part. To see it simply take S * i := µ i ∈M i (t i ) BR i (marg S −i µ i ) and set:
There exists a σ i ∈ ∆(S i ) such that:
Clearly, F * ⊆ F and f ∼ i g i h for every f, g ∈ F * i and every h ∈ F i \ F * i .
Notice that in the presence of incomplete preferences 'undomination' (an act not being strictly worse than some other act) and 'optimality' (an act being at least as good as every other act) are two different concepts, which is not the case under completeness: An optimal act is always undominated but an undominated act might not be optimal; furthermore, every Bewley preference admits undominated acts, but there may not exist optimal ones. Decisiveness ensures the existence of the latter, which in turn, restores the equivalence of undomination and optimality. In consequence, imposing decisiveness on incomplete preferences is similar in spirit to the requirement of Bayesian updating for conditional probability systems in the literature of extensive-form games. 43 As for decisiveness, Bayesian updating guarantees the existence of optimal strategies by forcing them to be equivalent to undominated ones.
B Characterization result
As mentioned in the main text, we first prove the result for every finite iteration.
Theorem B1. Let G be a game and T a complete ambiguous type structure. For any n ∈ N and every player i the following holds:
Proof. For the sake of convenience, for each player i we denote X i,0 := S i × T i and for any n ∈ N, X i,n := R i ∩ C i ∩ CARC i,n−1 . Now, we proceed by induction on n:
Initial
Step (n = 0). For the right-hand inclusion, set strategy-type pair (s i ,t i ) ∈ R i ∩ C i and denoteM i = M i (t i ). Then, sincet i is cautious, we know that there exists a belief µ 1 i ∈M i whose support is S −i × T −i , and since (s i ,t i ) ∈ R i , we know thats i is a best-reply for marg S −i µ 1 i . Thus,μ 1 i := marg S −i µ 1 i is a conjecture in with full-support on S −i for which s i is a best-reply. Hence,s i ∈ W 1 i . For the left-hand inclusion, set strategys i ∈ W 1 i and conjectureμ i with full-support on S −i for whichs i is a best-reply. Then, take arbitrary full-support belief η i ∈ ∆(T −i ) and set
i has full-support on S −i × T −i we know thatt i is cautious, and hence, that (s i ,t i ) ∈ C i , and ass i is a best-reply to the marginal on S −i induced by the unique belief in M i (t i ) it follows that (s i ,t i ) ∈ R i . Thus, it can be concluded that (s i ,t i ) is a strategy-type pair in R i ∩ C i that inducess i .
Inductive
Step. Suppose that n ≥ 0 is such that the claim holds. We next verify that it also holds for n + 1. For the right-hand inclusion, set strategy-type pair (s i ,t i ) ∈ R i ∩ C i ∩ CARC i,n+1 and denoteM i := M i (t i ). Then, since (s i ,t i ) ∈ R i ∩ C i ∩ CARC i,n it is known know from the induction hypothesis thats i ∈ W n+1 i , and since (s i ,t i ) ∈ R i ∩ CARC i,n+1 there must exist a belief µ n+1 i ∈M i whose support is the closure of X −i,n+1 := j =i X j,n+1 and whose marginal on S −i admitss i as a best-reply. It follows from the induction hypothesis and completeness that the support ofμ n+1 such that for each k = 1, . . . , n + 2: (i)μ k i has full-support on W k−1 −i , and (ii)s i is a bestreply toμ k i . Now, set arbitrary k = 0, . . . , n + 1 and for any player j = i and any strategy s j ∈ W k j define:
which is known from the induction hypothesis to be non-empty. It is also known from the induction hypothesis that {Y j,k (s j )|s j ∈ W k j } is a finite cover of Proj T j (X j,k ). Now, for each s −i ∈ W k −i pick arbitrary belief η k i (s −i ) ∈ ∆( j =i Y j,k (s j )) whose support is the closure of j =i Y j,k (s j ), and define belief µ k i in ∆(S −i × T −i ) as follows:
Obviously, µ k i is well-defined and its support is exactly the closure of X −i,k := j =i X j,k . 44 Notice in addition that that since the marginal of µ k i on S −i is preciselyμ k+1 i , we know that s i is a best-reply to µ k i . Then, letM i be the convex hull of {µ k i } n+1 k=0 and pick typet i ∈ T i such that M i (t i ) =M i . Clearly, the following two hold:
• (s i ,t i ) ∈ C i ∩ CARC i,k for any k = 0, . . . , n + 1. To see this, simply note that for any k = 0, . . . , n + 1, it holds that µ k i ∈ M i (t i ) =M i . Then, the claim is proven since (as seen above) the support of µ k i is exactly the closure of X −i,k .
• (s i ,t i ) ∈ R i . This follows immediately from-as seen above-s i being a best-reply to the conjecture induced by each belief in {µ k i } n+1 k=0 and thus, also to each belief in M i (t i ).
Thus, it can be concluded that (s i ,t i ) is a strategy-type pair in
(i) For any complete ambiguous type structure, any player i and any strategy-type pair (s i , t i ), if type t i is consistent with cautiousness and assumption of rationality and cautiousness and s i is rational for t i , then s i is iteratively admissible; i.e.,
Proof. For the right-hand inclusion set strategy-type pair (s i ,t i ) ∈ R i ∩ C i ∩ CARC i and simply notice that since (s i ,t i ) ∈ R i ∩ C i ∩ CARC i,n for any n ≥ 0, Theorem B1 reveals thats i ∈ W n i for any n ≥ 1. Thus,s i ∈ W ∞ i .
44 For the latter, simply note that for any (s−i, t−i), µ k i [N ] > 0 for any neighborhood N of (s−i, t−i) if and only if η k i (s−i)[N ] > 0 for any neighborhood N of (s−i, t−i).
For the left-hand inclusion, set strategys i ∈ W ∞ i . Since, in particular,s i ∈ W n+1 i for any n ≥ 0, it is known from Theorem B1 that for any n ≥ 0 there exists a type t n i ∈ T i such that (s i , t n i ) ∈ R i ∩ C i ∩ CARC i,n . Now, letM i denote the closure of the convex-hull of n≥0 M i (t n i ) and pick typet i ∈ T i such that M i (t i ) =M i . Obviously,s i is a best-reply is to every conjecture induced by the beliefs in M i (t i ) andt i is cautious and is consistent with common assumption in rationality and cautiousness. Thus, (s i ,t i ) ∈ R i ∩ C i ∩ CARC i and hence,s i ∈ Proj S i (R i ∩ C i ∩ CARC i ).
For the characterization of self-admissible sets, the first thing needed is the simple observation that the reasoning process about strategies only stops after finitely many rounds.
Lemma B1. Let G be a game. Set an ambiguous type structure T . There exists a N ∈ N such that for all n ≥ N ,
Proof. By definition CARC i,n+1 ⊆ CARC i,n , so that it also holds that R i ∩C i ∩CARC i,n+1 ⊆ R i ∩ C i ∩ CARC i,n . Since S i is finite there has to be an N i ∈ N such that n ≥ N i
Take N = max i N i .
Proof. For the first part set an ambiguous type structure T and consider Q := i∈I Proj S i (R i ∩ C i ∩ CARC i ) .
If Q = ∅ then Q is a SAS. So assume it is non-empty. Set s i ∈ Proj S i (R i ∩ C i ∩ CARC i ); then there exists a t i such that (s i , t i ) ∈ R i ∩ C i ∩ CARC i . Thus (s i , t i ) ∈ R i ∩ C i implies that condition (i) of SAS is satisfied. Furthermore, with N from Lemma B1 and because (s i , t i ) ∈ CARC i ⊆ CARC i,N +1 there must exist a µ i ∈ M i (t i ) such that supp µ i = j =i R j ∩ C j ∩ CARC j,N . Then,μ i := marg S −i µ i is a conjecture with full-support on Q −i (again using Lemma B1) for which s i is a best-reply. Hence, condition (ii) of SAS is satisfied.
Lastly, consider mixed strategy σ i such that U i (s −i ; σ i ) = U i (s −i ; s i ) for every s −i . Then, by Lemma D.2 of Brandenburger, Friedenberg and Keisler (2008) 
for every µ i ∈ M i (t i ) giving (r i , t i ) ∈ R i for all r i ∈ supp σ i . Then it also holds that (r i , t i ) ∈ R i ∩ C i ∩ CARC i,n for every n ≥ 1, so that r i ∈ Proj S i (R i ∩ C i ∩ CARC i ) and thus, condition (iii) of SAS is satisfied too.
For the second part set SAS Q. By definition of SAS (and Pearce, 1984) , for each s i ∈ Q i , there exist a µ 1 i (s i ), µ 2 i (s i ) ∈ ∆(S −i ) such that supp µ 1 i (s i ) = S −i and supp µ 2 i (s i ) = Q −i . By Lemma D.4 of Brandenburger, Friedenberg and Keisler (2008) we choose µ 1 i (s i ) so r i ∈ BR i (µ 1 i (s i )) if and only if r i ∈ supp σ i for a mixed strategy σ i with U i (s −i ; σ i ) = U i (s −i ; s i ) for every s −i . Now, consider the set of types T i := {t i (s i )|s i ∈ Q i } ∪ { i }; to get an ambiguous type structure define M i ( i ) ⊆ ∆(S−i × T −i ) such that there is no η i ∈ M i ( i ) with supp η i = S −i × T −i . For s i ∈ Q i , define, Y i (s i ) := {(r i , t i (s i )) : either r i = s i or ∃σ i ∈ ∆(S i ), such that r i ∈ supp σ i and U i (s −i ; σ i ) = U i (s −i ; s i ) for all s −i ∈ S −i } and then define two beliefs η 1
To complete the description of the type structure, set M i (t i (s i )) to be the convex hull of η 1 i (s i ) and η 2 i (s i ). Note that R i only depends on the marginal beliefs on the strategies, so for η 2 i (s i ) to be well-defined the following is required:
Claim 1: Proj S i s i ∈Q i Y i (s i ) ∩ R i = Q i . If s i ∈ Q i , then (s i , t i (s i )) ∈ Y i (s i ) and by construction also (s i , t i (s i )) ∈ R i . Conversely, set r i ∈ Proj S i s i ∈Q i Y i (s i ) ∩ R i . So there exists a s i ∈ Q i such that (r i , t i (s i )) ∈ Y i (s i ) ∩ R i . If r i = s i , the proof is complete. If not, then by property (iii) of self-admissible sets (and definition of Y i (s i )), we it also follows that r i ∈ Q i .
Next we prove that the type structure satisfies that:
Then for some s i ∈ Q i we have η 1 i (s i ) and thus t i (s i ) is cautious. Conversely, for (r i , t i ) ∈ R i ∩ C i it is needed that t i = i since i is not cautious. Thus, there exists a s i ∈ Q i such that t i = t i (s i ).
If s i = r i , the proof is complete. If not, then R i requires that r i ∈ BR i (µ 1 i (s i )), which holds if and only if (see above) r i ∈ supp σ i for a mixed strategy σ i with U i (s −i ; σ i ) = U i (s −i ; s i ) for every s −i . Thus, in either case it holds that (r i , t i (s i )) ∈ Y i (s i ).
Claim 3:
Then, (r i , t i (s i )) ∈ CARC i,1 due to η 2 i (s i ). The converse follows from Claim 2.
Induction concludes the proof.
